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POLYCENTRISM AND FLUX IN SPATIALIZED
MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM MAINE’S
LOBSTER (HOMARUS AMERICANUS) FISHERY
Jennifer F. Brewer
ABSTRACT

Spatial approaches to fisheries management hold great promise but require
continued conceptual and policy development. Polycentrism and flux emerge
as useful concepts, drawing lessons from more customary, informal resourceuse patterns to produce more innovative “spatialized” policies within existing
governance architectures. Empirical evidence from Maine shows that pioneering
efforts have been limited by the single-species focus of conventional management
hierarchies. As entry limits have consolidated the fishing fleet and eliminated
flexible, diversified, and adaptive business strategies, cross-species and habitat
externalities have become problematic. State lobster (Homarus americanus MilneEdwards, 1837) comanagement zones have achieved some successes, including trap
limits and improved industry-management communications, but incur significant
transaction costs and raise equity and stewardship concerns. Kindred proposals for
spatial refinement of groundfish management and locally based area-management
councils lack support from the state Department of Marine Resources, Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission, New England Fishery Management Council,
and National Marine Fisheries Service. Broader and more transparent deliberation
of explicitly spatial and ecosystem approaches might be advanced by citizen
panels convened to foster polycentric decision structures and accommodate more
integrative management strategies.

Interest in explicitly spatial approaches to marine policy has increased in recent
years (Crowder et al., 2006; Ehler and Douvere, 2007; Young et al., 2007; Douvere and
Ehler, 2008). “Spatialized” frameworks have been initiated in European and Australian ocean policy contexts, and states such as California, Oregon, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island are following suit. Nonetheless, practical implementation proves more
difficult in many cases. As linked policy and scientific discussions continue in this
direction, fisheries present acute socioecological challenges. The fluidity and physical extent of marine environments, and related limitations to human observation of
behaviors and distributions of marine organisms and harvesters, make difficult the
establishment of fixed and discrete boundaries that might withstand the multiple resource-access claims and decision horizons of a diverse public. Competing pressures
on marine space increase with new demands for sustainable energy, transportation,
biotic and abiotic resources, leisure activities, and environmental conservation. Biooceanographic changes will probably accelerate because of entropy in the planetary
climate system, despite the most valiant efforts to mitigate anthropogenous climate
drivers. Correspondingly, fishing practices manifest strategic and adaptive choices
across space, species, gear, markets, and capital and labor investments. Only significant policy innovation can cope with flux, movement, and shifting public priorities
in closely coupled human-marine systems. Spatial approaches offer real benefits, but
their ultimate effectiveness will require more thought, nuance and refinement than
they have received thus far. In particular, existing governmental structures may not
have sufficient adaptive capacity to monitor or regulate more localized attributes
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of biophysical and social boundaries in marine environments. Here, I offer, among
many possible avenues for the conceptual development of more spatialized fisheries
management, polycentric governance and contingent boundaries as useful design
concepts.
As many sciences continue to sift through the achievements and disappointments
of mid-20th century quantitative revolutions, inconvenient empirical observations
confound our most abstract reductions of spatial and temporal phenomena. Among
other legacies, Cartesian confidence that spatial statistics can thoroughly explain
human-environment relationships make way for poststructuralist reminders that
everything is “place-based.” Less loudly announced but nonetheless implicit in this
geographic turn, attributes of specific places are necessarily understood as being
specific in time. Obvious though these insights may seem, they have yet to pervade
the practice of fisheries management and policy. Congressional reauthorization of
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) in 2006 did little to dislodge the legal primacy of large-scale single-species yield models, despite widespread
scientific recognition that tools better honed for spatial and temporal precision are
needed (NRC, 1998; Wilson et al., 1999; Hilborn et al., 2005; Young et al., 2007).
Compelling arguments have been made that more spatialized marine resource
management can provide increased protection to marine habitat and species, reduce
conflicts among groups, improve coordination among agencies, and increase stewardship incentives among users (Wilson et al., 1999; Crowder et al., 2006; Young et
al., 2007; Douvere and Ehler, 2008). Some of these authors also point to the need
for cross-scalar institutional mechanisms, but none explicitly suggests that crossscalar governance ought to accommodate not only the hierarchically nested jurisdictions typical of modern nation states but also polycentric governance modes—and
the latter are difficult to envision and implement without ceding greater intellectual
ground to stochastic models of socioecological systems. Similarly, few authors grapple with the virtual inevitability of social and ecological flux across even the most
carefully assigned boundaries, perhaps because doing so immediately deflates our
collective confidence in solving a multitude of marine policy challenges with tidy
mapping exercises. As discussed below, these concepts of polycentrism and flux may
prove useful in the struggle to overcome excessive transaction costs and governance
dysfunction in fisheries management, spatialized or otherwise. Insightful theoretical
precedent and concrete examples are found in political theory, geography, ecology,
and interdisciplinary literatures. Evidence from Maine’s lobster (Homarus americanus Milne-Edwards, 1837) fishery encourages us to consider more specific benefits
and challenges of practical implementation. Although this and other fisheries could
benefit from more thoughtful management attention to spatially specific phenomena, meaningful regulatory progress in this direction also requires new mechanisms
for analysis and deliberation across socioecological variables that are thus far overlooked in formal management.
Polycentrism and Flux
Polycentric governance as a theoretical construct differs somewhat from prevailing understandings of hierarchy theory (Ostrom et al., 1961; Simon, 1962; Gunderson
and Holling, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Rocheleau and Roth, 2007; Pahl-Wostl
et al., 2008). As in dynamic hierarchical systems, polycentric interunit relationship
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may be independent or interdependent, informal interactions can be as important as
formal ones, and cooperative and competitive feedback loops intersect. Rather than a
neatly nested and discrete array of organizational units, however, polycentrism envisions less orderly networks of governing bodies with partly overlapping jurisdictions.
Formal and informal attributes such as group membership or spatiotemporal extent
may be incongruent. Polycentric governance institutions are less permanent; they
may arise, reform, or dissolve in response to functional needs and do not offer the
same breadth of goods or services provided by conventionally hierarchical jurisdictions such as municipalities, states, provinces, or nations. Polycentrism’s particular
relevance to the present discussion is that it permits more flexible and opportunistic
institutional design, more mutable boundaries, and less fixed and exclusive loyalties
among members. It may even encourage policy entrepreneurship through the prospect of competing providers of ecosystem goods and services (Hooghe and Marks,
2003). In the present era, polycentric governance is unlikely to maintain complete independence from hierarchical arrangements, because nation states provide essential
legal, monetary, and physical resources. Nonetheless, some scholars point to more
autonomous examples in alliances of corporations and nongovernmental organizations, Swiss cantons, the European Union, and the high seas (Ruggie, 1993; Rosenau,
1997; Frey and Eichenberger, 1999; Steinberg, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2003).
Concepts of flux are prominent in hierarchy theory, often referring to information passed up and down scalar levels of organization (Simon, 1962; Gunderson and
Holling, 2002; Walker et al., 2006). My discussion here considers flux as movement
and influence across socioecological boundaries, such that the boundaries must be
recognized as contingent, flexible, or fuzzy. Boundaries may be contingent in both
spatial and temporal terms in that they move over time, become more or less permeable over time, are more porous in some physical locations than in others, and are
more easily transgressed by some people or things than others. This phenomenon
is well documented in geographic studies of international borders and territories,
where borderland residents may play one governmental authority against another,
selectively mobilize territorial identities and governmental processes to leverage local natural resource access, or continually revise cultural conceptions of “us” and
“them” (Sahlins, 1989; Newman and Paasi, 1998). International-relations scholar
John Ruggie asserts further that the norm of discrete and exclusive territories is
an evolutionary anomaly, specific to the episteme, or rationality, of modernity, and
therefore vulnerable to fundamental transformation in the postmodern era (Ruggie,
1993). Indeed, urban mixed-use neighborhoods and medieval, kin-focused, peasant,
indigenous, and nomadic societies provide numerous examples where livelihoods,
social relationships, migration patterns, and historical precedent often trump territorial claims (Jacobs, 1961; Bruce et al, 1993; Ruggie, 1993; Scott, 1998; Steinberg,
2001; Mol and Law, 2005).
Although some observers might assume that polycentrism and flexible boundaries
are less able to internalize externalities, accounting for externalities often depends
on the temporal and spatial units of analysis and rarely takes into account costs
across formal and informal organizational units such as business firms, government
offices, and broader social structures (Commons, 1934; Granovetter, 1985; Acheson,
1994). In particular, fluctuating transaction costs of monitoring, enforcement, and
institutional reform are often overlooked in comparison to static costs of initial establishment and routine adjustments.
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Although they generally use different terminology, geographers and anthropologists in the shared subfield of political ecology point out the unpredictability of
interactions between polycentric and hierarchical structures in natural-resource
management (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007). They particularly emphasize the prevalence of polycentric structures within informal resource-management regimes, where
subgroups differentiated by class, age, gender, ethnicity, or other factors perpetuate different patterns and norms of resource use and resource user group bounding.
They frequently stress the movement of material, financial, and human resources;
ideologies; practices; and policies across scales and boundaries of human-environment systems, whether these bounds be analytical, physical, or social, and despite
the inherent methodological challenges of such studies. This evidence underscores
the need to assess resource management regimes not only from the perspective of
administrative functionaries but with close attention to material manifestations visible at the local level. For example, a founding treatise in political ecology articulated
causal chains through which political and economic marginalization can worsen
environmental degradation by shortening decision horizons and eroding norms of
resource stewardship (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). By way of contrast, analyses
bounded by conventionally ecological or economic parameters are unlikely to reveal
such socioecological feedbacks. Another study observed that fences surrounding formally declared parklands can make poachers of local residents who breach them to
pursue longstanding subsistence and religious practices (Bruce et al., 1993). Such a
mismatch between more static legal tenure categories and more fluid preexisting
customary systems can escalate social tensions, raise transaction costs, and reduce
conservation incentives. A somewhat later paper reported that petty corruption can
significantly reroute the localized impacts of government policies for natural resource management (Robbins, 2000), reminding us that not only resource users but
also government officials have multiple and conflicting loyalties. Yet another noted
that, as resource-dependent peasant communities ally with environmental groups to
oppose industrial enclosures of local resources, multinational industry groups coalesce to rebut with global public-relations campaigns (Stonich, 2000). Clearly, these
informal networks built across sub- and supragovernmental scales can challenge formal governmental efforts.
In all these examples, different groups claim legitimacy through different moral
authorities and sources of political power. Resource-use conflicts arise or intensify
and the transaction costs of conservation efforts escalate when governance fails to
accommodate diverse livelihood strategies, patterns of resource access, and conceptions of appropriate decision processes. Whether rigid or flexible, social and biophysical boundaries require maintenance and monitoring, raising questions about
who will be responsible for these activities and to whom they will be accountable.
In more metatheoretical terms, when hierarchical institutions neglect polycentrism
and flux across material, social, and discursive domains, policy outcomes become
less certain. In this vein, management of Maine’s lobster fishery provides an instructive example of differences between polycentric and hierarchical architectures in
marine governance and of the significance of flux across contingent socioecological
boundaries.
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Learning from the Maine Lobster
The set of data informing the present analysis includes more than 200 interviews
and informal conversations with more than 150 fishing-industry members and more
than 70 fisheries professionals and scientists; more than 80 randomized surveys
completed by Maine fishermen; participant observation in fishing households, on
working waterfronts, at professional and scientific meetings, aboard fishing boats,
and at more than 35 public meetings; and review of relevant textual sources in printed and electronic formats. These activities took place over the last decade, mostly in
Maine but also in Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., Alaska, and other locations in
the United States and other countries.
Informal Practices
As Jim Acheson (1988) documented two decades ago, entry to Maine’s lobster
fishery has long been governed informally by harbor- and kin-based groups. Also
noted but more rapidly forgotten was that, until late in the last century, many if
not most lobstermen also participated in other coastal fisheries, such as those for
groundfish—which often include cod (Gadus morhua Linnaeus, 1758), haddock
[Melanogrammus aeglefinus (Linnaeus, 1758)], winter flounder [Pseudopleuronectes
americanus (Walbaum, 1792)], American plaice [dab, Hippoglossoides platessoides
(Fabricius, 1780)], witch flounder [grey sole, Glyptocephalus cynoglossus (Linnaeus,
1758)], saithe [Atlantic pollock, Pollachius virens (Linnaeus, 1758)], silver hake
[whiting, Merluccius bilinearis (Mitchill, 1814)], red hake [Urophycis chuss (Walbaum,
1792)], and Acadian redfish (Sebastes fasciatus Storer, 1854)—or for northern bluefin
tuna [Thunnus thynnus (Linnaeus, 1758)], shrimp (Pandalus borealis Krøyer, 1838),
scallops [Placopecten magellanicus (Gmelin, 1791)], herring (Clupea harengus
harengus Linnaeus, 1758), Atlantic medhaden [pogy, Brevoortia tyrannus (Latrobe,
1802)], Jonah and rock crabs (Cancer borealis Stimpson, 1859, and Cancer irroratus
Say, 1817), or, eventually, urchins [Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis (Müller, 1776)]
(Wilson, 1982; Acheson, 1988). As detailed in field interviews, the decision of which
species to fish was determined by species availability, market prices, labor and
capital resources, and the willingness of other fishermen to share local ecological
knowledge. Whereas close family members were virtually guaranteed entry, the
decision to support or tolerate fishing entry by neighbors or more distant kin was
made entirely outside the legal system, permitting fishing-reliant communities to
adapt to changing social and ecological conditions. When fishing effort was deemed
excessive, fewer new entrants were permitted. When new entrants might be useful to
maintain markets, fishing areas, labor pools, local economies, or needy households,
entry could be granted more generously. Certainly the system was not without flaws,
such as the ability of some families or groups to consolidate decision influence
through violence, but broad deliberations and protracted negotiations involving a
number of local residents were often possible. Such conversations could take place
on the water, at the shore, around town, and in households where the perspectives
of other family members might be considered. Local youth generally built up their
business and expertise by hand hauling a few cast-off lobster traps from a small
rowed skiff. Some new adult entrants could work their way in by settling in town,
crewing, and biding their time while generally ingratiating themselves. In this way,
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each fishery and each fishing group represented one of many in a flexibly bounded
and overlapping pattern of polycentric decision making. The fishing industry was
notorious for its disinterest in most aspects of legal regulation, except for widespread
adherence to laws protecting young and broodstock lobsters, which gained popularity
after a lobster population crash in the first part of the 20th century (Acheson, 1988,
2004). Until the 1990s, these laws were debated and set by the state legislature, after
public hearings and informal conversations between elected representatives and any
interested constituents.
Field observation reveals that, in addition to these movements of individuals across
the social boundaries of fishing communities, spatial arrangements in the lobster
fishery have also exhibited flux. The lobster-trap setting grounds of each harbor or
group have spatial boundaries, “invisible lines,” that are constantly contested and
negotiated. When unfamiliar or unwelcome traps appear at the perimeter of an area,
they might or might not be forcibly removed. Owners of offending traps might be
warned off initially with knots or opened trap doors. Sometimes persistent intrusion
will result in lost traps or more costly retaliation, but sometimes a game of lower
stakes tit-for-tat ensues for a short or lengthy period. New traps might be tolerated
on bottom of less immediate or general interest, or after a reciprocity agreement
in which access is traded for another piece of bottom. Once new traps are in place
for some time, they are considered to be more established by both area newcomers
and those with longer-term spatial claims. Similarly, in the past lobster catchers and
groundfish draggers would often agree to allocate some bottom for exclusive trapping or dragging, to avoid costly accidental damage to both sets of gear and the possibility of precipitating intentional gear damage in retaliation or to expand bottom
claims. These customary practices allowed integrated monitoring and maintenance
of social and biophysical boundaries and frequent consideration of proposed boundary adjustments.
Today, these informal norms of polycentrism and contingent boundaries still exist to some extent. Randomized surveys indicate that the majority of Maine fishermen have participated in more than one fishery in their lifetimes, some having
participated in more than 10 (see Table 1). Most harbors’ trap-setting areas are now
expanding and less strongly defended, but most boundaries continue to shift even
as some coalesce (Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Acheson, 2004). As conveyed by the
literatures reviewed above, such polycentric and flexibly bounded patterns are often
characteristic of informal, or extralegal, governance and resource management. As
long as markets, technology, and capital were limited, informal management was
relatively effective, with some assistance from the state legislature (Acheson, 2004).
As described below, however, an enveloping cascade of legal and regulatory events
occurred during the late 20th century, imposing a more hierarchical management
architecture and drawing more rigid boundaries. This shift toward a more fixed and
exclusionary policy framework was first resisted by both local harvesters and state
officials. Nonetheless, a gradual transformation increased state compliance with
federal administrative pressures, reduced the ecological and social adaptiveness of
the fishery, and produced limited gains in resource conservation. Several antecedent
drivers of this change sequence can be traced to Maine’s groundfishery.
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Table 1. Number of fisheries participated in by individual Maine commercial fishermen. n, number
of fishermen surveyed.
Survey group
n Mean no. fisheries
Maine commercial marine 12
4.0
harvest license holders
Maine commercial lobster 29
2.8
harvest license holders
Portland, Maine,
16
2.7
commercial groundfish
harvest permit holders

SD
3.2

Time period
lifetime

Survey year
2003

1.8

lifetime

2002

1.4 first fishery, 1983, 1993, 2003

2005

Regulatory Context
Passage of the FCMA in 1976 not only expelled foreign fishing vessels from the
newly declared Exclusive Economic Zone but created loans for larger boats and gear.
Previously, most Mainers caught groundfish with tub trawls and a few gillnets, neither of which require large boats or heavily damage benthic habitat. As reported by
many experienced fishermen, new investments in heavy otter trawls and roller gear
exposed previously unfished bottom to intensive fishing effort and habitat degradation. As groundfish populations declined, a landmark lawsuit by the Conservation
Law Foundation and Massachusetts Audubon Society in 1991, amendments to the
FCMA in 1996, and subsequent challenges from environmental groups increased
the intensity of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) oversight in groundfish and other fisheries through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC), originally
created by the FCMA as one of eight regional councils to help expand the domestic
fleet, responded by limiting new groundfish permits and limiting each permit’s annual fishing days, often favoring permit holders with the most dedicated groundfish
histories and pushing many fishermen with more flexible strategies into dedicated
lobstering, which was still open to new entrants. Other fisheries managed by the
NEFMC or Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) became subject to similar entry limits, gradually boxing each fisherman into fewer and fewer species and
creating political and social identities more focused on single fisheries and less interested in cross-species dynamics or the overall balance of the ecosystem.
Although many entry-limit decisions were certainly triggered by stock depletions,
some were disproportionately influenced by a small number of fishing firms, especially a handful of more specialized and capitalized boat owners who could afford the
shore time to protect their fishery access through NEFMC lobbying and participation. For example, field interviews and archival data confirm that when an environmental lawsuit forced the NEFMC to make dramatic cuts to aggregate groundfishing
days at sea in 2002, three of the six landings years selected retroactively as days at sea
qualification criteria were years with long and/or profitable winter shrimping seasons (1996–1998), during which many diversified boats had abbreviated or skipped
their usual spring groundfish rotation. Many of those boat owners were then granted
fewer groundfishing days than owners who had continued to concentrate on depleted groundfish species. The regulatory decision ignored common understanding
that shrimp populations and prices fluctuate dramatically with oceanographic and
economic drivers mostly unrelated to local fishing effort; can only sustain a seasonal
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and diversified fishery; and can be helpful in diverting fishing effort away from overfished species (Clark et al., 2000). Many small diversified boats had also suspended
their groundfish rotation during qualification years because of temporary inshore
gillnet bans designed to protect harbor porpoises (Phocoena phocoena Linnaeus,
1758). Trawlers had been allowed to continue fishing those waters, however, thereby
limiting incidental gains for groundfish stock conservation. Although the NEFMC
has also implemented some coarsely defined groundfish spawning-area closures inshore, industry members and community-based nongovernmental organizations requesting stronger and more empirically supportable protection of inshore spawning
habitats have been repeatedly rebuffed by NEFMC members and staff, often on the
grounds that any resulting conservation gains would not be recognized by federal
stock-assessment models. Notably, those models are constructed to assess species
populations on the spatial scale of the Gulf of Maine. They assume that the existing
time series of species population data incorporates sufficient spatiotemporal variation in factors such as benthic habitat structure, fishing technologies, fish migration
and spawning behaviors, water temperature and other oceanographic phenomena,
and other possible impacts on target species populations that are difficult to quantify
(Wilson et al, 1999; Ames, 2004). Adding insult to injury, continued fleet reductions
have not sufficiently restored groundfish populations. Now-excluded fishermen increasingly call for more spatialized and ecosystem-based approaches, as evidenced
by letters submitted to the NEFMC in 2006.
Although most groundfishermen started their careers on small lobster boats, those
who found themselves regulated out of groundfishing and refocused primarily on
lobstering had acquired larger boats, more willingness or ability to take on debt, and
more ambitious business plans. This trend accelerated a general increase in lobsterboat sizes, trap numbers, trap setting areas, and profit expectations. Effort especially
increased offshore on larger broodstock lobsters, which play a disproportionate role
in replenishing heavily fished inshore populations. Former groundfishermen, more
prepared for deep water and less prepared to defend claims to inshore customary
trap-setting areas, were among those who pioneered the offshore effort increase.
Most Maine fishermen opposed legal entry limits in the past. At least through
1978, more than two thirds of groundfish and herring-boat captains opposed them,
and even supporters were very concerned with the possibility of excluding young
people or restricting interspecies livelihood strategies (Acheson, 1980). On one large
and cooperatively run lobster wharf in 1989, a well established fishing family member alerted friends and neighbors to a proposal to limit lobster fishery entry but received blank stares and dismissive comments from fishermen who apparently found
the proposal incomprehensible or unworthy of discussion. As late as 2004 in a highly
fishing-dependent eastern Maine town, interview data documented that the vast majority of residents vigorously opposed entry limits for any fishery. Crew, often hoping
to have their own boats and licenses in the future, generally express stronger opposition, even in harbors with more entry-limit supporters.
Partly for these reasons, the state of Maine and its fishing industry have frequently
opposed NEFMC and NMFS policies, including fleet consolidation, and assumptions
in many federal impact assessments that fished stocks, habitats, and fishing communities are homogeneous across large areas. Some of these conflicts between state and
federal policies were partially resolved by reduction of NOAA’s direct management
oversight of lobster and other species. In 1995 the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
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Commission (ASMFC) was given a more central role as an interstate compact, leaving some regulatory discretion to individual states through provisions for conservation equivalencies. Nonetheless, NOAA began pressuring ASMFC to implement
lobster-trap limits in the Gulf of Maine and perhaps entry limits or other fleet-consolidation mechanisms.
Zone Comanagement
Because lobstermen in different parts of the Maine coast had developed different
fishing-effort levels and trap-limit preferences to accommodate local socioecological conditions, and because DMR leadership wished the industry to assume greater
responsibility for comanagement, in 1995 DMR convinced the state legislature to
create seven lobster zones along the state coastline, incorporating input from a few
lobstermen, and dividing each zone into several district subunits. DMR then developed administrative procedures for zone referenda and elected representation,
granting voting rights to lobster license holders (Acheson, 2004). Different trap
limits could now be established in different parts of the state, placating NOAA and
ASMFC while allowing the industry to adjust the rules to local needs and norms. Another, less-publicized intent, occasionally noted in more private conversations with
comanagement advocates in academia and DMR, was to use the lobster zones as a
foundation from which to build a more participatory and ecosystem-based management regime, permitting greater cross-species flexibility and greater consideration
of habitat and social variables. Nonetheless, the immediate intent of DMR leadership
was for the zone lines merely to delineate voting groups, not to restrict the spatial
extent of individual trap-setting areas.
After the zones passed trap limits, however, regulatory enforcement where adjacent zone trap limits differed required monitoring of zone lines and trap locations
by state marine patrol officers. Interviews reveal that some license holders cited the
new zone boundaries to assert fishing rights in waters beyond those fished by their
traditional harbor group but within their home zone. Others interpreted the zone
boundaries to mean that they were now authorized to exclude traps intruding from
adjoining zones, even if they belonged to lobstermen who had fished those same waters in the past. The increasing availability of cheap electronics for geographic positioning made it easier for fishermen to learn unknown bottom without assistance
from older peers. Violent and legal disputes arose around several boundaries, requiring DMR to invest in professional mediation, legal representation, and the creation
of buffer areas at some zone boundaries (Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Acheson, 2004).
Whereas informal fishing areas were constantly negotiated, the zones lines are fixed
in law. DMR also increased penalties for trap cutting, decreasing the industry’s ability to impose extralegal sanctions on unwanted individuals and actions. Whereas a
few lobstermen had to reduce their trap numbers to comply with trap limits, others
increased their traps because they could now compete more easily with the most
ambitious fishermen.
Newly empowered by zone voting rights and fixed spatial claims, and now excluded from most other fisheries, some lobstermen successfully lobbied the legislature for
additional legal power to restrict entry by voting on ratios of exit to entry. Despite initial refusals by DMR to approve very restrictive exit-to-entry ratios, in five zones a series of increasingly exclusionary votes established ratios issuing only one new license

296

BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010

for each five licenses not renewed. In one zone one license is issued for each three
licenses not renewed, and one zone still remains open to new entrants. Waiting lists
have become years long, and a 2008 DMR survey found half of lobster license holders
to be supportive of a statewide license freeze. Although all zones still allow 18-yearolds with 3 yrs of lobstering experience to circumvent waiting lists and obtain full
licenses, most have seriously debated repealing that provision. As one member of a
multigenerational fishing family and staunch entry-limit opponent said, “There were
always a few people who wanted [entry limits]. But until there was a receptive government, it didn’t go anywhere. It was like looking at a girlie magazine. These things
can be incremental. Then one day you go in and everyone has a girlie magazine on
their desk and you say ‘okay’” (anonymous source, 1999). Although many observers
and current lobster-license holders uphold entry limits as necessary for fishery conservation and economic profits, many members of would-be fishing households believe their permanent exclusion to be profoundly unjust, observing before the global
economic recession that some lobstermen fishing the most productive areas were
raking in annual profits exceeding $200,000. Although the specter of overfishing is
frequently cited by industry, management, and academic observers as the necessitating driver for entry limits, the particular choice of a stringent entry limit mechanism
instead of more spatioecologically nuanced options such as gear restrictions or area
protections has been made likely by the relative ease with which fleet reduction and
specialization mechanisms satisfy federal effort-reduction mandates. Conservation
arguments for entry limits have been quietly undermined as state and academic fisheries scientists and lobster harvesters have repeatedly contested longstanding federal
declarations that the lobster populations is overfished (Steneck, 2006).
Archival and interview sources confirm that legal entry limits also overtook a slower-moving DMR plan to establish a formal lobster-fishery apprenticeship, which was
to mimic the flexibility and social breadth of traditional entry practices by requiring
new license holders to invest two years as crew and acquire management-relevant
knowledge and skills through an organized education program. The education program was never implemented, and the few individuals completing apprenticeships
now find they must wait some years longer for a license. Whereas apprenticeship was
intended to establish more socially mediated and contingent barriers to entry, zoneentry ratios grant current license holders legal exclusion rights and foster a sense of
entitlement and enclosure. In areas where the few remaining groundfishermen still
operate, trap-versus-drag gear conflicts have escalated, because so few fishermen can
now participate in both fisheries, and most view one another as competitors instead
of allies. Knowing that cod prey on lobster, most lobstermen finding cod in their
traps now spear them for bait, although a few who still hope to groundfish some day
release them alive to reproduce. In contrast, those most interested in the future of
groundfishing, even low-volume hook fishing, are often inspired to note and discuss
the spatial and habitat patterns of accidentally trapped cod, just as they routinely
track lobster migrations and habits to maximize yields per trap haul. Although lobstermen routinely observe and memorize the movements and behavior of lobsters
across local bottom, adjusting trap setting strategies to maximize per trap hauls over
time, no zones have seriously discussed the possibility of area closures, even as catches and populations have declined from all time highs in 2006 and 2002 (Correia et
al., 2005). Even longstanding arguments for seasonal closures during molting season,
when recently molted lobsters are difficult to market, have gained little traction.
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Whereas zone districts were originally envisioned as a site of local comanagement
participation and engagement, they now operate primarily to elect zone representatives. Because voting on exit-to-entry ratios, trap limits, and other key issues occurs
through mail-in referenda, collective discussion is often limited and is unlikely to
include non–license holders such as crew, family members, or other fishing-related
businesses. Without the repeated kitchen-table and pickup-truck conversations that
were required to mobilize informal agreements to include or exclude fishing activities by kin and neighbors, active consideration of ethical responsibilities and public
welfare at the community level is diminished. Voting requires significant oversight
and administration by DMR staff, who also provide secretarial and advisory support
at each zone meeting and ensure that zone procedures are codified to withstand legal
scrutiny from both industry members and environmental groups. The zones have
also been fortunate enough to inherit relatively healthy lobster populations (Steneck,
2006). Their response during a period of dramatic resource decline remains to be
seen. The possibility of widespread disease or mortality caused by rising water temperatures like those in Long Island Sound and southern New England remains a
lurking worry.
Expansion of more spatialized comanagement to other Gulf of Maine fisheries has
been slow. The time required of industry members who become actively involved
in comanagement rule making for a single fishery is significant. Active comanagement participation in more than one fishery is virtually impossible without reduction
of fishing time. Although DMR recognizes the importance of the lobster zones in
improving communications between the industry and the agency, most other statemanaged fisheries bring lower prices, fish depleted populations, attract less public
attention as statewide icons, and are less politically powerful. Repeated grassroots
requests to permit some decentralization of groundfish management, or at least
some refinement of the spatial scale at which management occurs, have not gained
DMR support, partly because of a change in its leadership shortly after the zones
were created.
Scaling Up?
As noted above, previous DMR leadership once hoped to expand comanagement
and apprenticeship to other fisheries. Some fishing-industry members and nonprofit
organizations working with coastal communities have come to share that hope. A
few express support for the idea of multiple-fishery licensing as a vehicle for ecosystem-based stewardship. Little progress has been made in this direction, however;
federal policies are a primary impediment. As long as environmental lawsuits and
NOAA legal defenses focus on the prognoses of relatively aspatial, single-species statistical models, the advance of substantively spatial and ecosystem-based approaches
will be difficult. This incongruence between aspatial single-species policies and interest in more place- and ecosystem-based alternatives among some environmental
and industry groups suggests that structural problems are slowing the transfer of
information and innovation up and down these scales of human-environment decision making and are increasing transaction costs to a point at which the NEFMC
process is scarcely functional. Foundational social-science research tells us that
government often incurs high transaction costs as a result of bounded rationality,
imperfect knowledge, opportunism, and other institutional foibles (Acheson, 1994).
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Regulatory capture by private firms is not uncommon. Less frequently discussed is
the likelihood that environmental organizations exhibit related limitations and have
strategic reasons to prefer legal or public-relations battles to less confrontational solutions. Because both NEFMC and judicial routes to fisheries-management reform
have been mostly unsuccessful in the Gulf of Maine, another option might be to create a set of parallel management institutions, reverting to a more hybrid governance
architecture that incorporates polycentric and hierarchical modes and more flexible
boundaries to accommodate socioecological and analytical flux such as across fished
species, fishing group memberships, and species-habitat variables.
For example, one study led by the former DMR commissioner, a pivotal lobster
comanagement zones advocate, proposed the creation of local multi-interest committees as area-based governance units, balanced by statewide species committees.
These would base decisions on multiple ecological parameters, in addition to singlespecies stock assessment indicators (Alden and Hayden, 2003). Keeping the history
of existing regional fishery management councils firmly in mind, however, we might
consider that government advisory groups, fisheries related or not, are often convened through some process of stakeholder group representation, overlooking the
reality that most individuals bring a number of internally inconsistent interests to
the table, that a small group can rarely represent the full breadth of interested groups
and subgroups, and that such representative designation can sometimes polarize
and entrench narrow conflicts rather than fostering consensus or policy innovation.
In this case, the relevant interests run far beyond fishing-license holders to include
crew, households, shoreside businesses, environmental groups, and many other users of marine resources. Because the proposed area advisory groups could become
dominated by narrow fishing interests, and vulnerable to the rigid bounding of fishery-access rights promoted by federal managers and some environmental groups, we
might further speculate that a parallel institutional mechanism could be given some
oversight or monitoring role, representing an even broader slate of interests.
Among possible parallel institutions, consensus conferences, citizen panels, and
citizen juries provide attractive options. These closely related vehicles for public input on policy and regulatory issues were pioneered in the United States by the National Institutes of Health but are more widely adopted in northern Europe to address
technological hazards (Andersen and Jæger, 1999; Gustin, 1999). They gather small
stratified groups of neutral, disinterested citizens to produce collective policy opinions. Professional staff normally facilitate each group’s acquaintance with relevant
information and arguments, including scientific opinion. Each group deliberates in a
nonadversarial and transparent venue with the goal of reaching consensus, or at least
a well-considered majority vote. In some instances participants are selected from a
larger prospective pool, as in a courtroom jury. A steering committee is sometimes
convened to oversee the process.
The scale and terms of such diversified citizen involvement would certainly require
significant discussion and analysis before implementation, including the articulation
of relationships across new and existing management structures. It could, however,
help to complement single-species fish population assessments, which, in our overarching system of governmental checks and balances, are often the principal criterion by which individual courtroom judges evaluate agency efforts to juggle disparate
social interests and comply with federal law. For those skeptics who might argue
that average citizens are incapable of integrating scientific information into complex
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rule making, the National Research Council recently released a report concluding
that public participation, when thoughtfully implemented, can increase the quality, legitimacy, and capacity of environmental policy (NRC, 2008). As any scientist
who interacts frequently with the general public will attest, questions from nonexperts may not reflect theoretical sophistication but are often quite incisive in their
ability to seek out weaknesses in our underlying assumptions and extrapolations to
public policy. Permanent mechanisms for more broadly public oversight could also
strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the governance process, something often
advocated but rarely practiced in natural-resource management.
Conclusion
As described above, inflexible hierarchies and boundaries can limit the ecosystem
potential of spatial fisheries-management decision making. Maine’s lobster fishery
retains remnants of flexible, polycentric, and adaptive governance, rooted in local,
customary practices that can accommodate socioecological flux. Fishing firms were
once diversified across target species and habitats, and informal entry controls and
fishing area claims were subject to extensive negotiations; in this way, social and
biophysical boundaries could be carefully monitored and maintained. The federal
intensification of formalized management imposed new constraints on more localized and integrative resource use strategies, as single-species policies have failed to
internalize cross-species and habitat externalities. The creation of area-based lobster comanagement zones has achieved some success but has fallen short in other
respects. NOAA and NEFMC pursuit of legal entry limits and fleet consolidation
have been replicated at the zone and state levels, ostensibly by channeling of industry
preferences through the legislature and DMR, but also by a process of elimination,
as more holistic and ecosystem-cognizant alternatives are now difficult to advance.
Industry priorities have been realigned from collective to individual concerns, entrained within overarching policies of a relatively rigid regulatory hierarchy. More
spatial, ecosystem-based, and adaptive management innovations have been stalled.
Broader public participation in area management—including citizen panels or related mechanisms of enhancing public accountability, informed deliberation, and
transparent decision processes—might be helpful in loosening this deadlock. With
thoughtful implementation, these could bring more rigorous and evaluative scrutiny to the goals, processes, and knowledge foundations of fisheries decision making
and might provide avenues for more formal integration of human, cross-species, and
habitat variables.
As proposals for more spatialized mechanisms for marine resource management
move forward, whether under the umbrella of marine planning, zoning, protected
areas, fishing-area closures, or ecosystem-based management, the mixed outcomes
from the Maine case may be instructive. As in terrestrial resource systems, many
marine harvester groups exhibit adaptive informal rule making with polycentric governance and flexible boundaries that accommodate socioecological flux. These can
be eroded by rigidly hierarchical policies that encourage discrete bounding of species access rights while failing to consider more complex causal relationships among
social and biophysical variables.
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